Valantis Documentation
Valantis Website
  • Welcome to Valantis
  • Sovereign Pool
    • The Modules
      • Pool Manager
      • Liquidity Module
      • Swap Fee Module
      • Verifier Module
      • Oracle Module
      • Sovereign Vault
        • Rebase token support
      • Gauge
    • Interacting with Pools
      • Swap Parameters
      • Swap Steps
      • Multi Token Support
      • Deposit Liquidity
      • Withdraw Liquidity
      • Flash Loans
  • Hybrid Order Type (HOT)
    • Understanding HOT: A Graphical Overview
    • HOT API
      • HTTP request parameters
      • HTTP request response
      • Reasoning for Request structure
      • Solver Integration
      • Market Maker integration
    • HOT Smart Contracts
      • Interfaces
      • State variables and roles
      • AMM
      • HOT Swap
      • AMM Swap
      • Hybrid Order Type (HOT) struct parameters
      • Alternating Nonce Bitmap
      • Deposits
      • Withdrawals
      • Deployment Assumptions
    • Liquidity Manager Docs
      • Reference Oracle
      • Deposit
      • Withdraw
      • Signature
    • Swap
      • Swap Context
      • AMM Swap
      • HOT Swap
      • HOT Quote Parameters
        • Bitmap Nonce Instructions
    • Solver Docs
      • Solver Request
      • Simple HOT Swap Example
      • Partial Fill HOT Swap Example
    • Risks and Trust Assumptions
      • Roles
        • Sovereign Pool Manager
        • HOT Manager
        • HOT Signer
        • Liquidity Provider
      • Threats
        • Deposit Sandwich
        • Malicious Price Bound
        • Malicious Signer
        • Mispriced HOT Quote
  • Validly
    • Understanding Validly
    • Swap
    • Deposits and Withdrawals
    • Deployments
  • Stake Exchange (stHYPE AMM)
    • Swap
      • Instant Withdrawals (LST -> Native Token)
      • New Stake (Native Token -> LST)
    • LP Positions
      • LP Withdrawals Instant
      • LP Withdrawal Queued
    • Ratio Fee
    • Lending of Reserves
    • Smart contracts
      • STEXAMM.sol
      • StHYPEWithdrawalModule.sol
      • StexRatioSwapFeeModule.sol
      • DepositWrapper.sol
      • AaveLendingModule.sol
    • Risks and Trust Assumptions
    • Integration examples
  • Deploy and Build
  • Resources
    • Audits
    • Links
    • Get HYPE on HyperEVM
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  • Functions
  • Security Model
  • Trust Assumptions

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  1. Hybrid Order Type (HOT)
  2. Risks and Trust Assumptions
  3. Roles

HOT Manager

Functions

  • setManager: Changes the manager of the HOT contract.

  • setSigner: Changes the signer of the HOT contract.

  • setMaxTokenVolumes: Changes the maximum token volumes available for a single HOT quote.

  • setMaxAllowedQuotes: Updates the maximum number of HOT quotes allowed in a single block.

  • setMaxOracleDeviationBips: Sets the maximum allowed deviation between AMM and Oracle price.

  • setPause: Sets the pause flag, which instantly pauses all critical functions except withdrawals.

Security Model

  1. All HOT manager functions except setPause should be placed under an appropriate timelock. LPs should verify that they are comfortable with the timelock value before depositing into the pool.

  2. The manager acts like a guardian over the security parameters of the pool. This role should be controlled by a neutral, independent entity, completely separate from the signer and liquidityProvider roles.

  3. The manager should actively monitor HOT transactions and pause the pool if any malicious activity is observed.

  4. The maxAllowedQuotes variable should be set to relatively low values considering the signer's needs and the chain's block time. Higher maxAllowedQuotes values could allow the signer to sign a malicious HOT and drain some portion of LP funds in a single block. In most practical systems, a maxAllowedQuotes > 5 should not be needed.

  5. The maxTokenVolumes values should be set to relatively low values, proportional to the reserves in the pool. It should be updated regularly as the reserves increase or decrease.

  6. The maxOracleDeviationBips variable should be set to a relatively low value, considering the token pair's volatility and the oracle's latency.

Trust Assumptions

If bounds are set incorrectly, then at least two known attacks could become possible:

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Last updated 1 year ago

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Malicious Signer Threat
Deposit Sandwich Threat